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Articles on Corporate Welfare and Corporate Tax Issues

May 17, 2007 by staff

Corporate Tax Evasion and Tax Rate Issues

Apr 2007
Big Tax Breaks for Big Boxes (Syracuse Post Register)
Feb 2007
Wal-Mart: Always Low Taxes (Baltimore Sun)
Jan 2007
Transnational Corporations Dodging Taxes Through “Transfer Pricing”
Sep 2006
Stop Corporate Tax Evasion in Montana
Nov 2004
The Gap Between Statutory and Real Corporate Tax Rates
Sep 2004
Corporate Taxes Continue to Plummet
Apr 2004
Corporate Tax Evasion via Offshore Subsidiaries: A Primer

 

Corporate Welfare / Subsidies

July 2005
The Sugar Industry and Corporate Welfare
Apr 2004
Corporate Tax Evasion via Offshore Subsidiaries
Dec 2003
Wal-Mart, the Abuse of Eminent Domain and Corporate Welfare
Nov 2003
Republican Energy Bill Gives Away Billions to Bush Investors
June 2003
Nuclear Power is Corporate Welfare
Apr 2003
Once Foes of Big Tobacco, States Have Been Hooked

 

Useful Books and Websites on These Issues

  • Perfectly Legal by David Cay Johnson, 2003. The Pulitzer Prize-winning New York Times reporter reveals how the U.S. tax system is rigged to allow corporations and the very rich to elude paying anywhere near their official tax rate.
  • Taxpayer.net – A group dedicated to cutting corporate pork.
  • Citizen Works – has compiled a great deal of useful information on this topic
  • Cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb105-9.html – Guidelines from the libertarian-oriented Cato Institute to help congress reverse corporate welfare.
  • NewRules.org/retail/veto.html – This page offers several useful resources on curbing corporate welfare.

We welcome your suggestions for especially informative articles, studies, etc., including those that disagree with our perspectives.

Filed Under: Corporate Welfare / Corporate Tax Issues

Big Tax Breaks for Big Boxes

April 8, 2007 by staff

New York state program subsidizes chains, handicaps independent businesses

By Michelle Breidenbach and Mike McAndrew
First Published by the Syracuse Post Standard April 01, 2007

Jim Cronk runs the kind of hardware store that offers a good deal on rock salt because he bought it in bulk and divided it into empty kitty litter pails he picked up at a farmers market.

Cronk fuels a coal-burning stove in the Mallory Lumber & Steel showroom, where friends and customers discuss the news and exchange advice about the proper way to install a metal roof.

Cronk’s store in Hastings is halfway between the Lowe’s Home Center in Cicero and the one in Oswego. He just heard state taxpayers are giving the big-box retailer $3.6 million a year in Empire Zone tax breaks. The home improvement store will be reimbursed for its property taxes and will pay reduced state income taxes for at least 10 years.

“If they get free taxes, that’s just like free money,” Cronk said.

Cronk is not in the zone. Last year, he paid state income taxes, sales taxes and about $4,000 in local property taxes, he said.

He waved a colorful newspaper insert from Lowe’s and said he wished he had the extra money to advertise, to stock all the little gadgets people want and to employ a couple of people.

Raby’s Ace Home Center, family-owned in Oswego since 1916, is not in the Empire Zone program, either. That store suffered when Lowe’s moved in three miles away, Robert Raby said.

“It’s a little frustrating when you are, in a sense, subsidizing your own competition, ” Raby said. “We’re not anti-competition or anything like that. I guess we’re for fair competition.”

Until last month, New York state officials would not tell the public how much tax relief each of the 9,667 zone businesses expected. The Post-Standard won a lawsuit that forced the information into the light for the first time.

Around the fire at Mallory’s and elsewhere in the state, business owners who are not getting tax breaks are scanning the list of the ones who did.

In addition to Home Depot and Lowe’s, state taxpayers also subsidized Wal-Mart, Target, Price Chopper, Kinney Drugs and AutoZone stores. Those national chains alone drew an estimated $9 million in zone breaks in 2005.

The state’s taxpayers are underwriting a small number of fast-growing national chain stores that are headquartered out of state and already have the competitive advantage of bigness. The big-box deals highlight the inequity of the Empire Zone program: 2 percent of the state’s businesses are subsidized with the taxes paid by the rest of them.

Former Gov. George Pataki and state legislators intended the program as a tool to lure job-creating businesses into downtowns and impoverished neighborhoods. Clever lawyers and accountants quickly found ways to get themselves and their clients on the list — no matter that they were old companies, losing jobs or building in the suburbs.

Raby’s considered using an accounting gimmick to squeeze into the program. All the store had to do was change its name and the store would have qualified for tax breaks meant for a new company.

“But we’re an established business,” Raby said. “My understanding was that this was for new businesses. We didn’t want to do the name-change game. We didn’t feel that’s how the program was supposed to work.”

State Sen. Liz Krueger, D-Manhattan, called big-box stores “another bunch of minimum-wage, go-nowhere, no-benefit jobs” that undercut existing businesses.

“So the state of New York helped you put X number of people out of a job,” she said. “I don’t remember that ever being part of the discussion. I don’t remember anyone saying, ‘Let’s try to put Mom-and-Pop stores out of business.’ ”

Retailing giants cash in 
Krueger said it is difficult to argue for taxpayer help for Home Depot and Lowe’s.

The two largest home improvement retailers in the United States count their earnings in the billions. They are locked in fierce competition, and they open stores in New York with or without government help.

Home Depot has 2,147 stores worldwide, including 100 in New York. The company built two stores on Staten Island only six miles apart. Both won Empire Zone tax breaks.

Home Depot created 363 jobs at nine zone locations. Those stores paid workers an average of $9.63 an hour. Forty-one percent of the workers are part-timers, records show.

Lowe’s created 560 jobs at the seven stores where it gets Empire Zone credits. More than half are part-timers. The company paid an average of $10.98 per hour, records show.

At the same time, Lowe’s paid its chief executive officer $3.69 million, plus stock options. In January, Home Depot sent away its CEO with a $210 million severance package.

“We believe incentives create a win-win situation,” Lowe’s spokeswoman Karen Cobb said. “By bringing a Lowe’s store to the community, we are creating an average of 150-200 new jobs as well as generating tax revenue for the community.”

Home Depot had no comment.

All over the nation, local hardware stores are fighting government tax breaks for wealthy, out-of-state retailers. Maine and Minnesota are even thinking about imposing an extra tax on the big chains that either do not pay a living wage or have more than one-quarter of the employees working part time, according to the Institute for Local Self-Reliance, a national anti-sprawl group.

The group contends state government winds up paying Medicaid costs for uninsured workers and services associated with sprawling development. The group’s Web siteoffers studies showing that communities with big-box stores fare worse in terms of poverty rates, job loss and social and civic well-being.

The retail pie is only so big, experts say.

“Obviously, if you create a new store, you’re not creating new consumer spending,” said Stacy Mitchell, author of the book “Big-Box Swindle” and a senior researcher with the anti-sprawl group. “You can only do that if you grow the population or you increase people’s disposable income.

“My organization thinks that you should never give subsidies for retail development, except for maybe some low-income neighborhoods where you’ve got a distressed main street that’s so far gone that it’s hard to figure out how the market’s going to bring it back.

“For the most part, we don’t think you should give money to retail because you’re not generating any new economic activity. You’re just moving it around.”

Lowe’s in Oswego opened Dec. 8, 2004, with 170 employees.

Sixteen months later, an 84 Lumber store across the street closed. That company did not get Empire Zone money. Other small competitors met a similar fate. Cronk knows because he buys up their extra merchandise to sell at Mallory Lumber & Steel.

‘Our famous bureaucracy’ 
Cronk has read the laws that created the Empire Zone program. He has left telephone messages for his legislators – Sen. Jim Wright and Assemblyman David Townsend. He said they have not returned his calls.

If they did, he would tell them that he thinks bureaucracy is to blame for a system that allows a store on one side of the street to qualify for tax breaks while the store on the other side does not.

“It’s our famous bureaucracy. If you’re Jim Wright, you say, ‘This is one hell of a program. We’ve done a great job,’ ” Cronk said as he pulled on his sweatshirt collar to imitate Wright straightening his suit jacket. “But they didn’t take the next step and make sure the legislative intent is followed properly.”

The governor and the state Legislature created the program and then handed it off to a state agency to administer. That state agency relies on local economic development officials to select businesses for the program. At first, there were few rules about the kinds of businesses that could qualify.

“If you were in the zone and were creating a job, it was a straight certification. There wasn’t the scrutiny,” said Carol Bolam, deputy director of the state Empire Zone program.

Wright, a member of the Senate Economic Development Committee, said the state tried to make the program broad so local communities could bring in businesses that fit that area.

“In the absence of manufacturing, the big boxes have become the large employers the localities go after,” Wright said.

Local governments like retail stores because they generate local sales taxes. And it does not hurt the local tax base for the local officials to give businesses state money.

The program’s cost has grown from $30 million in 2000 to an estimated $558 million this year.

E.J. McMahon, a senior fellow at the fiscally conservative Manhattan Institute, said this is a classic example of local government officials being “very generous with other people’s money.”

“People all over the state are going to underwrite property taxes for a big-box store in Oswego,” McMahon said. He says the state should use the money to cut business taxes for everyone in New York .

The state does still consider retail stores for the program, but it encourages local zone coordinators not to focus on retail except in a depressed downtown.

“If you need to attract a retail business to a distressed area, then it’s much more acceptable than if it’s going to a natural market area in the suburbs and it doesn’t really need an incentive,” Bolam said.

Onondaga County allowed the Lowe’s store in fast-growing Cicero into the Empire Zone program in 2004, records show. Another Lowe’s in Camillus was approved in 2005.

Don Western, Onondaga County ‘s economic development director, said Lowe’s is in the program only because the county put three troubled old malls in the zone before they knew who the new tenants would be. If Lowe’s came to the county directly to ask for government help, Western said, it would likely not get it.

“I don’t understand why that kind of retail would be an acceptable use of the program in a county zone,” Western said.

The same is true in Watertown. Three years ago, Watertown added to its Empire Zone a new Home Depot just off an Interstate 81 exit. A year after Home Depot opened, Watertown ‘s Empire Zone board decided that it no longer wanted to add retailers to its zone unless they were downtown. But Home Depot will qualify for tax breaks for the next decade.

Pataki’s ‘global marketplace’ 
The city of Oswego is on an Empire Zone shopping spree that started with Wal-Mart. Its zone also includes Lowe’s, Price-Chopper, Kinney Drugs and others. Pataki announced in 2003 that the state had revised the boundaries of the zone in Oswego to bring in the Lowe’s store, Ruby Tuesday and Sunrise Nursing Home.

“By making these changes, more businesses will be able to create jobs and investment in New York and we can ensure that New Yorkers continue to have access to good jobs,” Pataki said in a news release. “In today’s global marketplace we are competing for each and every job.”

Retail fits the Lake Ontario tourism industry, said L. Michael Treadwell, executive director for Operation Oswego County , the county development office. He said the big-box boom along Route 104 has brought bank branches and other small retailers. The big boxes employ people, he said.

And now, customers are coming to shop at the Lowe’s in Oswego instead of the Lowe’s in Onondaga County, he said.

“If one went strictly by the argument that you don’t provide any assistance because there’s a competitive situation, then you wouldn’t provide any assistance to anybody, anywhere, at any time,” he said.

Treadwell said that Lowe’s gave Raby’s some competition, but he said they stood up to it and have survived.

“To the best of my knowledge, they’ve done very well since Lowe’s came to town,” Treadwell said.

But Lowe’s is getting free taxes and Raby’s is not.

Treadwell paused. “In my view, strictly in my view,” he said, “they should have put tighter restrictions on retail than they did. But they didn’t. The state didn’t do it.”

© 2007 Syracuse Post Standard

More Features on Corporate Tax Evasion and Subsidies

Filed Under: Corporate Welfare / Corporate Tax Issues, Walmart

Transnational Corporations Dodging Taxes Through “Transfer Pricing”

November 20, 2006 by staff

Some fleece taxpayers to the tune of billions annually

By Dr. Peter Rost – Published November 20, 2006

Drug companies and other multinational companies based in the U.S. systematically avoid paying tax in the U.S. on their profits. The companies elect to realize profits in low-tax countries and because of this the rest of us have to pay billions of unnecessary taxes to make up for the shortfall.

The biggest tax scam on earth has a very innocent sounding name. It is called “transfer prices.” That almost sounds boring. It is, however, anything but boring. Abuse of transfer prices is a key tool multinational corporations use to fool the U.S. and other jurisdictions to think that they have virtually no profit; hence, they shouldn’t pay any taxes.

Corporations involved in this scam are “model corporate citizens,” or so they would like us to believe. The truth is that they rob us all blind. The money we lose can be estimated in the tens of billions, or possibly hundreds of billions of dollars every year. We all end up paying higher taxes because rich corporations make sure they don’t.

But don’t take my word for this.

A few weeks ago U.K.-based GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), one of the largest pharmaceutical companies in the world, together with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) announced that GSK will pay $3.4 billion to the IRS to settle a transfer pricing dispute dating back 17 years. The IRS alleges that GSK improperly shifted profits from their U.S. to the U.K. entity.

And U.K. pharmaceutical companies are not alone with these kinds of problems. Merck, one of the largest U.S. drug companies, also this month disclosed that they face four separate tax disputes in the U.S. and Canada with potential liabilities of $5.6 billion. Out of that amount, Merck disclosed that the Canada Revenue Agency issued the company a notice for $1.8 billion in back taxes and interest “related to certain inter-company pricing matters.” And according to the IRS, one of the schemes Merck used to cheat American tax payers was by setting up a subsidiary in tax-friendly Bermuda. Merck then quietly transferred patents for several blockbuster drugs to the new subsidiary and then paid the subsidiary for use of the patents. The arrangement in effect allowed some of the profits to disappear into Merck’s own “Bermuda triangle.”

So what’s going on here, how have multinational drug companies been able to gouge us for years selling expensive drugs and then avoid paying tax on their astronomical profits?

The answer is simple. For companies in certain businesses, such as pharmaceuticals, it is very easy to simply “invent” the price a company charges their U.S. business for buying the company’s product which they manufacture in another country. And if they charge enough, poof; all the profit vanishes from the US, or Canada, or any other regular jurisdiction and end up in a corporate tax-haven. And that means American and Canadian tax payers don’t get their fair share.

Many multinational corporations essentially have two sets of bookkeeping. One set, with artificially inflated transfer prices is what they use to prepare local tax returns, and show auditors in high-tax jurisdictions, and another set of books, in which management can see the true profit and lost statement, based on real cost of goods, are used for the executives to determine the actual performance of their various operations.

Of course, not every multinational industry can do this as easily as the drug industry. It would be difficult to motivate $6,000 toilet seats. But the drug industry, where real cost of goods to manufacture drugs is usually around 5% of selling price, has a lot of room to artificially increase that cost of goods to 50% or 75% of selling price. This money is then accumulated in corporate tax-havens where the drugs are manufactured, such as Puerto Rico and Ireland. Puerto Rico has for many years attracted lots of pharmaceutical plants and Ireland is the new destination for such facilities, not because of the skilled labor or the beautiful scenery or the great beer—but because of the low taxes. Ireland has, in fact, one of the world’s lowest corporate tax rates with a maximum rate of 12.5 percent.

In Puerto Rico, over a quarter of the country’s gross domestic product already comes from pharmaceutical manufacturing. That shouldn’t be surprising. According to the U.S. Federal Tax Reform Act of 1976, manufacturers are permitted to repatriate profits from Puerto Rico to the U.S. free of U.S. federal taxes. And by the way, the Puerto Rico withholding tax is only 10%.

Of course, no company should have to pay more tax than they are legally obligated to, and they are entitled to locate to any low-tax jurisdiction. The problem starts when they use fraudulent transfer pricing and other tricks to artificially shift their income from the U.S. to a tax-haven. According to current OECD guidelines transfer prices should be based upon the arm’s length principle – that means the transfer price should be the same as if the two companies involved were indeed two independents, not part of the same corporate structure. Reality is that standard operating procedure for multinationals is to consistently violate this rule. And why shouldn’t they? After all, it takes 17 years for them to pay up, per the GSK example above, even when they get caught.

Another industry which successfully exploits overseas tax strategies to cheat us all is the hi-tech industry. In fact, Microsoft Corp. recently shaved at least $500 million from its annual tax bill using a similar strategy to the one the drug industry has used for so many years. Microsoft has set up a subsidiary in Ireland, called Round Island One Ltd. This company pays more than $300 million in taxes to this small island country with only 4 million inhabitants, and most of this comes from licensing fees for copyrighted software, originally developed in the U.S. Interesting thing is, at the same time, Round Island paid a total of just under $17 million in taxes to about 20 other countries, with more than 300 million people. The result of this was that Microsoft’s world-wide tax rate plunged to 26 percent in 2004, from 33 percent the year before. Almost half of the drop was due to “foreign earnings taxed at lower rates,” according to a Microsoft financial filing. And this is how Microsoft has radically reduced its corporate taxes in much of Europe and been able to shield billions of dollars from U.S. taxation.

But remember, this is only one example. Most of the other tech companies are doing the same thing. Google recently also set up an Irish operation that the firm credited in a SEC filing with reducing its tax rate.

Here’s how this is done in the software industry and any other industry with valuable intellectual property. A company takes a great, patented, American product and then develops a new generation. Then, of course, the old product disappears. Some, or all, of the cost and development work for the new product takes place in Ireland, or at least, so the company claims. The ownership of the new generation product and all income from licensing can then legally be shared between the U.S. parent company and the offshore corporation or transferred outright to the tax-haven. The deal, to pass IRS scrutiny, has to be made using the “arms-length principle.” Reality is that the IRS has no way of controlling all these transactions.

Unfortunately those of us working and paying tax in the U.S. can’t relocate our jobs and our income to Ireland or another tax haven. So we have to make up the income shortfall. In the U.S. we have a highly educated society with a very qualified workforce, partly supported by our tax payers. This helps us generate breakthrough products. But once a company has a successful product, they have every incentive to move the second generation of a successful product overseas, to Ireland and a few other corporate tax havens.

There is only one problem for U.S. companies with this strategy, and that is that if they repatriate this money to the U.S. they have to pay full corporate taxes. In fact, according to BusinessWeek, U.S. multinational corporations have built up profits of as much as $750 billion overseas, much of it in tax havens such as the Ireland, Bahamas, and Singapore to avoid the stiff 35% levy they’d face if they repatriated the funds back into the U.S.

But of course, Congress, which is basically paid for by our multinational corporations, generously provided for a one-time provision in the corporate tax code, so that they could repatriate profits earned before 2003, and held in foreign subsidiaries, at an effective 5.25% tax rate.

And so the game goes on.

In the end, multinational corporations live in a global world which allows them to pretty much send their money to corporate tax havens at will, and then repatriate this money almost tax free, with the help of the U.S. Congress.

The people left holding the bag are you and me.

Peter Rost, M.D., is a former VP of Pfizer. He became well known in 2004 when he emerged as the first drug company executive to speak out in favor of reimportation of drugs. He is the author of “The Whistleblower, Confessions of a Healthcare Hitman.”

© 2006 Peter Rost

Related features:

  • Corporate Tax Evasion via Offshore Subsidiaries: A Primer
  • Corporate Taxes Continue to Plummet
  • The Gap Between Statutory and Real Corporate Tax Rates
  • Corporate Tax Evasion in Montana

Filed Under: Corporate Accountability, Corporate Welfare / Corporate Tax Issues, Globalization

Tax Increment Financing: A Bad Bargain for Taxpayers

January 1, 2006 by staff

By Daniel McGraw 
First published by Reason Magazine, January, 2006

The decision was made easier by the financing plan that Fort Worth will use to accommodate Cabela’s. The site of the Fort Worth Cabela’s has been designated a tax increment financing (TIF) district, which means taxes on the property will be frozen for 20 to 30 years.If you’re imagining an attraction that will draw 4.5 million out-of-town visitors a year, the first thing that jumps to mind probably isn’t a store that sells guns and fishing rods and those brown jackets President Bush wears to clear brush at his ranch in Crawford, Texas. Yet last year Cabela’s, a Nebraska-based hunting and fishing mega-store chain with annual sales of $1.7 billion, persuaded the politicians of Fort Worth that bringing the chain to an affluent and growing area north of the city was worth $30 million to $40 million in tax breaks. They were told that the store, the centerpiece of a new retail area, would draw more tourists than the Alamo in San Antonio or the annual State Fair of Texas in Dallas, both of which attract 2.5 million visitors a year.

Largely because it promises something for nothing—an economic stimulus in exchange for tax revenue that otherwise would not materialize—this tool is becoming increasingly popular across the country. Originally used to help revive blighted or depressed areas, TIFs now appear in affluent neighborhoods, subsidizing high-end housing developments, big-box retailers, and shopping malls. And since most cities are using TIFs, businesses such as Cabela’s can play them off against each other to boost the handouts they receive simply to operate profit-making enterprises.

A Crummy Way to Treat Taxpaying Citizens
TIFs have been around for more than 50 years, but only recently have they assumed such importance. At a time when local governments’ efforts to foster development, from direct subsidies to the use of eminent domain to seize property for private development, are already out of control, TIFs only add to the problem: Although politicians portray TIFs as a great way to boost the local economy, there are hidden costs they don’t want taxpayers to know about. Cities generally assume they are not really giving anything up because the forgone tax revenue would not have been available in the absence of the development generated by the TIF. That assumption is often wrong.

“There is always this expectation with TIFs that the economic growth is a way to create jobs and grow the economy, but then push the costs across the public spectrum,” says Greg LeRoy, author of The Great American Jobs Scam: Corporate Tax Dodging and the Myth of Job Creation. “But what is missing here is that the cost of developing private business has some public costs. Road and sewers and schools are public costs that come from growth.” Unless spending is cut—and if a TIF really does generate economic growth, spending is likely to rise, as the local population grows—the burden of paying for these services will be shifted to other taxpayers. Adding insult to injury, those taxpayers may include small businesses facing competition from well-connected chains that enjoy TIF-related tax breaks. In effect, a TIF subsidizes big businesses at the expense of less politically influential competitors and ordinary citizens.

“The original concept of TIFs was to help blighted areas come out of the doldrums and get some economic development they wouldn’t [otherwise] have a chance of getting,” says former Fort Worth City Councilman Clyde Picht, who voted against the Cabela’s TIF. “Everyone probably gets a big laugh out of their claim that they will draw more tourists than the Alamo. But what is worse, and not talked about too much, is the shift of taxes being paid from wealthy corporations to small businesses and regular people.

“If you own a mom-and-pop store that sells fishing rods and hunting gear in Fort Worth, you’re still paying all your taxes, and the city is giving tax breaks to Cabela’s that could put you out of business,” Picht explains. “The rest of us pay taxes for normal services like public safety, building inspections, and street maintenance, and those services come out of the general fund. And as the cost of services goes up, and the money from the general fund is given to these businesses through a TIF, the tax burden gets shifted to the regular slobs who don’t have the same political clout. It’s a crummy way to treat your taxpaying, law-abiding citizens.”

Almost every state has a TIF law, and the details vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. But most TIFs share the same general characteristics. After a local government has designated a TIF district, property taxes (and sometimes sales taxes) from the area are divided into two streams. The first tax stream is based on the original assessed value of the property before any redevelopment; the city, county, school district, or other taxing body still gets that money. The second stream is the additional tax money generated after development takes place and the property values are higher. Typically that revenue is used to pay off municipal bonds that raise money for infrastructure improvements in the TIF district, for land acquisition through eminent domain, or for direct payments to a private developer for site preparation and construction. The length of time the taxes are diverted to pay for the bonds can be anywhere from seven to 30 years.

Local governments sell the TIF concept to the public by claiming they are using funds that would not have been generated without the TIF district. If the land was valued at $10 million before TIF-associated development and is worth $50 million afterward, the argument goes, the $40 million increase in tax value can be used to retire the bonds. Local governments also like to point out that the TIF district may increase nearby economic activity, which will be taxed at full value.

So, in the case of Cabela’s in Fort Worth, the TIF district was created to build roads and sewers and water systems, to move streams and a lake to make the property habitable, and to help defray construction costs for the company. Cabela’s likes this deal because the money comes upfront, without any interest. Their taxes are frozen, and the bonds are paid off by what would have gone into city coffers. In effect, the city is trading future tax income for a present benefit.

But even if the dedicated tax money from a TIF district suffices to pay off the bonds, that doesn’t mean the arrangement is cost-free. “TIFs are being pushed out there right now based upon the ‘but for’ test,” says Greg LeRoy. “What cities are saying is that no development would take place but for the TIF.…The average public official says this is free money, because it wouldn’t happen otherwise. But when you see how it plays out, the whole premise of TIFs begins to crumble.” Rather than spurring development, LeRoy argues, TIFs “move some economic development from one part of a city to another.”

Development Would Have Occurred Anyway
Local officials usually do not consider how much growth might occur without a TIF. In 2002 the Neighborhood Capital Budget Group (NCBG), a coalition of 200 Chicago organizations that studies local public investment, looked at 36 of the city’s TIF districts and found that property values were rising in all of them during the five years before they were designated as TIFs. The NCBG projected that the city of Chicago would capture $1.6 billion in second-stream property tax revenue—used to pay off the bonds that subsidized private businesses—over the 23-year life spans of these TIF districts. But it also found that $1.3 billion of that revenue would have been raised anyway, assuming the areas continued growing at their pre-TIF rates.

The experience in Chicago is important. The city invested $1.6 billion in TIFs, even though $1.3 billion in economic development would have occurred anyway. So the bottom line is that the city invested $1.6 billion for $300 million in revenue growth.

The upshot is that TIFs are diverting tax money that otherwise would have been used for government services. The NCBG study found, for instance, that the 36 TIF districts would cost Chicago public schools $632 million (based on development that would have occurred anyway) in property tax revenue, because the property tax rates are frozen for schools as well. This doesn’t merely mean that the schools get more money. If the economic growth occurs with TIFs, that attracts people to the area and thereby raises enrollments. In that case, the cost of teaching the new students will be borne by property owners outside the TIF districts.

Such concerns have had little impact so far, in part because almost no one has examined how TIFs succeed or fail over the long term. Local politicians are touting TIFs as a way to promote development, promising no new taxes, and then setting them up without looking at potential side effects. It’s hard to discern exactly how many TIFs operate in this country, since not every state requires their registration. But the number has expanded exponentially, especially over the past decade. Illinois, which had one TIF district in 1970, now has 874 (including one in the town of Wilmington, population 129). A moderate-sized city like Janesville, Wisconsin—a town of 60,000 about an hour from Madison—has accumulated 26 TIFs. Delaware and Arizona are the only states without TIF laws, and most observers expect they will get on board soon.

First used in California in the 1950s, TIFs were supposed to be another tool, like tax abatement and enterprise zones, that could be used to promote urban renewal. But cities found they were not very effective at drawing development into depressed areas. “They had this tool, but didn’t know what the tool was good for,” says Art Lyons, an analyst for the Chicago-based Center for Economic Policy Analysis, an economic think tank that works with community groups. The cities realized, Lyons theorizes, that if they wanted to use TIFs more, they had to get out of depressed neighborhoods and into areas with higher property values, which generate more tax revenue to pay off development bonds.

The Entire Western World Could Be Blighted
Until the 1990s, most states reserved TIFs for areas that could be described as “blighted,” based on criteria set forth by statute. But as with eminent domain, the definition of blight for TIF purposes has been dramatically expanded. In 1999, for example, Baraboo, Wisconsin, created a TIF for an industrial park and a Wal-Mart supercenter that were built on farmland; the blight label was based on a single house in the district that was uninhabited. In recent years 16 states have relaxed their TIF criteria to cover affluent areas, “conservation areas” where blight might occur someday, or “economic development areas,” loosely defined as commercial or industrial properties.

The result is that a TIF can be put almost anywhere these days. Based on current criteria, says Jake Haulk, director of the Pittsburgh-based Allegheny Institute for Public Policy, you could “declare the entire Western world blighted.”

In the late 1990s, Pittsburgh decided to declare a commercial section of its downtown blighted so it could create a TIF district for the Lazarus Department Store. The construction of the new store and a nearby parking garage cost the city more than $70 million. But the property taxes on the new store were lower than expected, as the downtown area surrounding Lazarus never took off the way the city thought it would. Sales tax receipts were also unexpectedly low. Lazarus decided to close the store last year, and the property is still on the block. Because other businesses were included in the TIF, it is impossible to predict whether the city will be on the hook for the entire $70 million. But given that the Lazarus store was the centerpiece of the development, it is safe to say this TIF is not working very well, and Pittsburgh’s taxpayers may have to pick up the tab.

If businesses like Lazarus cannot reliably predict their own success, urban planners can hardly be expected to do a better job. Typically, big corporations come to small cities towing consultants who trot out rosy numbers, and the politicians see a future that may not materialize in five or 10 years. “The big buzzwords are economic development,” says Chris Slowik, organizational director for the South Cooperative Organization for Public Education (SCOPE), which represents about 45 school districts in the southern suburbs of Chicago, each of which includes at least one TIF. “The local governments see a vacant space and see something they like that some company might bring in. But no one thinks about what the costs might be.…They are giving away the store to get a store.” Big-box retail chains such as Target and Wal-Mart seem to be the most frequent beneficiaries of TIFs. (Neither company would comment for this story, and local politicians generally shied away as well.)

Given the competition between cities eager to attract new businesses, TIFs are not likely to disappear anytime soon. “Has it gone overboard?” asks University of North Texas economist Terry Clower. “Sure.…But the problem is that if a city doesn’t offer some tax incentives, the company will just move down the road.” According to Clower, “In a utopian world, there would be no government handouts, and every business would pay the same tax rate. But if a city stands up and says they aren’t doing [TIFs] anymore, they will lose out.”

Instead, it’s the competitors of TIF-favored businesses that lose out. Academy Sports & Outdoors, which employs 6,500 people, has about 80 sporting goods stores in eight Southern states, including a store in Fort Worth. When the Fort Worth City Council was considering the TIF for Cabela’s, Academy Sports Chairman David Gochman spoke out against the tax incentives, realizing that his company is a big business, but not big enough. “This is not a nonprofit, not a library, not a school,” he said. “They are a for-profit business, a competitor of ours, along with Oshman’s and Wal-Mart and others.”

TIFs Have Become the Standard Handout
Al Dalton, owner of Texas Outdoors, a 10,000-square-foot hunting and fishing shop in Fort Worth, echoed the sentiment that the city was favoring one business over another. “We don’t have the buying power, and we don’t have the advertising dollars,” Dalton said. “It doesn’t make any difference even if we’ve got the best price in town if nobody knows about it. The deep pockets, in every way, [make] a lot of difference.”

And that may be the key to understanding how TIFs are now applied: The companies with the deep pockets are able to fill them with subsidies.

The Cabela’s location in Fort Worth does not fit any of the blight criteria people had in mind when TIFs were first created. The 225,000-square-foot store, with its waterfalls, multitude of stuffed animals, and wild game café, sits on prime property just off Interstate 35. It is a few miles down the road from the Texas Motor Speedway (which has its own TIF), and the 200,000 NASCAR and IRL fans who attend races there three times a year—not to mention the fans who come to the speedway’s concerts and other special events—might want to shop at Cabela’s.

The area around Cabela’s is affluent and has been growing for years. A half-dozen shopping centers nearby were on the drawing board well before the TIF was considered. Within a five-mile radius of the hunting/fishing megastore, 10,000 new homes have been built since 2000. That same area is expected to grow by 20,000 people in the next two years.

But the argument against the “but for” assumption is not being heard. In 2004 a state judge threw out a lawsuit against the Cabela’s TIF by a Fort Worth citizens’ group that claimed blight was never proven, and that the city was misusing TIFs in a prosperous area that needed no tax breaks for future development. The blight designation came from a pond and stream on the property. It was an odd designation, given that the property is in a prime development area and ponds and streams are not what one would classify as blighted.

The press releases and newspaper articles about the new Cabela’s emphasize that the store is going to draw more people to Texas than visit the Alamo (the studies were done by Cabela’s). The press release never mentions that a Bass Pro Shop store, part of a chain almost identical to Cabela’s, is just 10 miles down the road. While Cabela’s was negotiating its TIF with Fort Worth, it was also negotiating a TIF with the city of Buda, 120 miles away, outside of Austin. Cabela’s got about $20 million from Buda, and the same tourist claims are being made there. If each Texas store is going to draw 4.5 million tourists, as the chain claims, that means 9 million people will be coming to Texas every year just to visit the two Cabela’s stores.

“The notion that a hunting store would draw all these tourists is ridiculous,” says Greg LeRoy. “But what is even more ridiculous is cities thinking that tax breaks are the primary reason businesses relocate or expand in certain areas. There are so many other factors at play—transportation costs, good employment available, housing costs and quality of life for executives—that the tax breaks like TIFs aren’t very high up on their priority list. But these corporations are asking for them—and getting them—because everyone is giving them out. TIFs have become the standard handout, and the businesses have learned how to play one city off the other. Businesses would be stupid for not asking for them every time.”

If TIFs continue to multiply at the present rate, we may see the day when every new 7-Eleven and McDonald’s has its own TIF. That prospect may seem farfetched, but it wasn’t too long ago that cities wouldn’t even have considered giving up tens of millions of dollars in exchange for yet another store selling guns and fishing rods.

Daniel McGraw, freelance writer in Fort Worth, is the author of First and Last Seasons: A Father, A Son and Sunday Afternoon Football (Random House).

© 2006 Reason Foundation 

Recommended resources

  • The New Rules Project produces excellent material on problems with TIF andrecommendations for TIF reform.
  • Good Jobs First’s primer on TIF is a great introduction.
  • Openair.org offers more anti-TIF reading.
  • The Buckeye Institute provides a pro-TIF perspective.
  • Our webite section on Indepedent Business issues contains related articles of interest.

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Filed Under: Corporate Welfare / Corporate Tax Issues

Condemnation Nation

November 16, 2005 by staff

Retail chains and the big business of eminent domain

By Joshua Kurlantzick
First published by Harper’s Magazine, October, 2005

This June the Supreme Court handed down one of its most important property-rights decisions in decades. In Kelo v. New London, the Court ruled that the city of New London, Connecticut, could use eminent domain to seize homes–properties, the Court agreed, that were not “blighted or otherwise in poor condition”–from a handful of owners who refused to make way for a massive private redevelopment plan. The 5-4 decision confirmed the right of local governments to forcibly take property from one private owner and give it to another if the handover would presumably result in economic development–an affirmation of cities’ redefinition of the “public use” clause of the Fifth Amendment, which traditionally limited the taking of property to instances that benefited the larger public good. Indeed, throughout the nineteenth century and much of the twentieth, states invoked eminent domain primarily for these public uses, seizing smallholder land to build roads, parks, railroads, hospitals, and military bases.

In New London, however, the homes will not be replaced by a waterfront park or a school; they’ll make way for a conference center and hotel, an upscale office complex, and other structures designed to lure pharmaceutical giant Pfizer to the area–developments, it was successfully argued, that would bring increased tax revenue to economically distressed New London .

It was the Supreme Court’s more liberal jurists who voted in favor of New London , with Justice John Paul Stevens writing in the majority opinion that there “is no basis for exempting economic development from our traditionally broad understanding of public purpose.” Left-leaning editorial pages came out strongly in favor of the decision. The New York Times wrote that the ruling was “a welcome vindication of cities’ ability to act in the public interest.” “The court’s decision was correct,” agreed the Washington Post. Democratic leaders either touted the ruling or remained silent. Conservatives, on the other hand, quickly condemned the decision, with Florida Governor Jeb Bush calling it “horrible” and the Wall Street Journal opinion page, normally known for championing corporate interests, caustically noting that the Court’s liberals had given local governments “more or less unlimited authority to seize homes and businesses.” In her dissent, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor warned, “Nothing is to prevent the state from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.”

This political divide, perhaps, shouldn’t be surprising. Liberals have historically supported government’s right to use broad powers to promote the greater social good–from protecting minorities and the poor to revitalizing faltering communities–and have had to defend this position against increasingly vituperative attacks from conservatives, who decry government programs as “not the solution to our problems” but “the problem.” Are liberals right, however, in claiming that eminent domain remains more solution than problem? Between 1998 and 2002, according to a study by the Institute of Justice, a public-interest law firm specializing in property rights, more than 10,000 properties in forty-one states were taken or threatened by eminent domain so that the land could be given to another private interest. And these numbers may actually be understated. In Maryland alone there were 1,237 of these private-interest threats or seizures. Of the more than 5,500 condemnations filed or threatened in California between 1998 and 2002, 858 are known to be on behalf of other private parties; it is impossible to know how many of the remaining thousands were as well.

What these numbers reflect is not some noble effort to revitalize America ‘s cities but a concerted campaign by city governments, on the one hand, and large real-estate developers and “big-box” retailers, on the other, to exploit eminent domain for their own gain. The developers and retailers–stores such as Wal-Mart and Target, which build numerous warehouse-style outlets on vast swaths of land to keep costs down–already enjoy immense advantages, including huge tax breaks, over smaller competitors; and yet increasingly they are urging cities to condemn property to serve their own interests, and employing lobbyists and donating large sums to local officials to help this effort. Cities, hoping to generate greater tax revenue, have been eager to comply, mostly to the detriment of homeowners and small businesses. To defend eminent domain as it is now practiced, therefore, is not a defense of our social compact with government, of the need for individuals to make sacrifices in the face of progress; it is an endorsement of a municipal-corporate collusion that now operates like a machine.

“The idea that you can invoke eminent domain is absolutely essential,” the mayor of Long Branch, New Jersey, Adam Schneider, explained to me. “Without that tool developers are not going to get on board.” And because companies now expect land seizure as part of their deal with cities, they will leverage the power of their tax revenues if city officials, their sizable economic redevelopment departments, or their hired private-public development corporations do not readily bend to their whims. In Long Beach , California, which has undergone extensive redevelopment of its waterfront and many commercial areas, the “developers are very well-versed in the legalities” of eminent domain, Councilman Frank Colonna told me. “The developers that get in are fully aware the city is committed to delivering the property, and would use eminent domain if we have to.” In the New London case, the president of Pfizer’s research department openly informed the city that if the company was to consider locating in New London, condemnation and redevelopment of adjacent areas would be vital. When megapharmacy chain CVS wanted to build a new drugstore in Ambridge, Pennsylvania, its local developer simply asked the government to seize the land and give it a lease; the town complied. In a more obscene flouting of public use, the city of Cypress, California, prevented a local church from building on property it had legally acquired in order to give the land to Costco.

Although cities and their development professionals at times select the land that they hope retailers will fill, in many cases retailers themselves find the choicest parcels of land, which they then ask cities to hand over. When Best Buy identified desirable land in Richfield, Minnesota, for the relocation and expansion of its corporate headquarters, Richfield guaranteed the company that it would use eminent domain to take property from the area’s existing businesses. In New Rochelle, New York, Ikea said it wanted to build a 300,000-square-foot store on fifteen acres of an existing neighborhood; the city agreed to clear the land, although public outcry later led Ikea to pull out of the deal. In fact, seeking sites with the idea of condemning them has become so routine that developers and retailers aren’t shy about their aims. A Costco vice president, in a frank letter to a shareholder in 2002, acknowledged that this was now normal operating procedure–that the company had initiated “dozens” of projects utilizing or threatening eminent domain to take away enough land from former tenants for its 148,000-square-foot stores. If Costco “refrained from participating in these deals,” the VP wrote, “our competitors for those sites, like Target, Home Depot, Kmart, Wal-Mart, BJ’s, Sam’s Club, and many others, would take advantage of our reticence.”

Even when a municipality’s economic-redevelopment agency is on board, developers and retailers must convince city councils and other elected officials that the condemnations are warranted. Consequently, developers and retailers have begun deploying, in unprecedented numbers, local lobbyists to win land concessions. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, the retail sales industry more than tripled its political contributions between 1990 and 2004; the real-estate industry’s contributions grew more than sevenfold during that same period.

In New York State alone, spending on municipal lobbying has grown from some $6 million per year in 1978 to $144 million in 2004, and the number of registered lobbyists has risen to over 3,800. In some cases the lobbying is blatantly venal. In Newark, New Jersey, for example, the city council was initially opposed to a redevelopment plan that involved seizing nine city blocks and 166 properties and building high-end condominiums in their place; when a coalition of developers contributed funds directly to two municipal councilmen, they suddenly changed their stance and allowed the proposal to go forward. In Lancaster, California, Costco repeatedly threatened to leave the city unless the municipality condemned a neighboring business, 99 Cents Only. Under pressure, the local government tried to entice the smaller store into leaving, then began proceedings to condemn its land. “99 Cents produces less than $40,000 [a year] in sales taxes,” the Lancaster city’s attorney reasoned. “And Costco was producing more than $400,000. You tell me which was more important.”

Cities and their officials have used eminent domain in other ways to line their pockets. The Southwestern Illinois Development Agency charged a commission fee for condemnations allotted for private use, in essence raising money directly from eminent domain. In Mesa, Arizona, and in Cincinnati, city council members or redevelopment-corporation board members either owned property that likely would have increased in value due to redevelopment or were themselves the contractors bidding on the lucrative construction projects.

Once the local government makes a decision to condemn, it still has to demonstrate to the public that the seizures are warranted. But this has turned out not to be difficult. It has become an accepted part of the process that a private developer can pay for a study showing the property is worthy of condemnation, and can pay the attorneys’ fees involved in seizing the land. (By comparison, the idea that pharmaceutical companies should pay a part of the Food and Drug Administration’s reviews of new medicines, a similar conflict of interest, has proven extremely controversial.) In St. Louis, Target and the city commissioned a blight study that showed a site’s electrical system was deteriorating. Yet the study failed to mention that Target was responsible for upkeep of the electricity at the site, where it already had one store, so the company itself had created the “blight” it then decried.

When such studies designate land as “blighted,” they make it easier for condemnation to proceed. But “blighted” is a subjective term, and definitions of blight vary widely from state to state. The city of Pittsburgh seized a neighborhood in which some 95 percent of the buildings were reportedly occupied. According to state redevelopment law, property can be declared blighted in New York if it lacks off-street parking. San Jose has marked a tenth of the entire city as blighted. After land is designated as blighted, the public is supposed to have a chance to respond. Yet cities and developers can essentially cut the public out of this process as well. In the St. Louis Target case, the city sent notice of the public hearing on condemnation to Target but not to the property holder. In other cases the municipality published these notices in the legal classifieds of local newspapers rather than sending information directly to property owners who stood to lose their land. When the government of Port Chester, New York, wanted to obtain parcels of land for a private developer, it published its notice of condemnation in the paper, without mentioning that landowners had only thirty days to challenge the order.

With a blight designation in hand, the city and the developer have considerable leverage. Most small landholders sell, since they rarely have the resources to fight the decision. Although states require the developer to pay “just compensation” for the land, this may not take into account the difference between what the city determines is fair market value and the property’s true open market value. Redevelopment officials in Port Chester offered one landowner less than half what local tax authorities said his property was worth. In Garden Grove, California, where the city wanted to redevelop large expanses of land, the municipal government offered only $16,000 for a successful auto business; a court later forced it to pay $950,000.

As this procedure has become increasingly routine, governments and developers have formed permanent partnerships, dangerously blurring the line between the public and private sectors. Almost all cities now have economic-development professionals, and these in turn have engendered their own trade associations. The National Congress for Community Economic Development, for one, has grown from a membership of forty development corporations in the early 1970s to over seven hundred today. And these development pros now have their own meeting and junket circuits, where they can rub shoulders with and woo retailers and developers. At one of the largest of these events, the International Council of Shopping Centers, held in Las Vegas, armies of retail executives, economic-development specialists, and officials from cities across the country mingle at booths designed to advertise a city’s appeal to big retail. A contingent from Fontana, California, at the 2005 International Council exposition included the mayor, his entire economic-development team, and several city councilors. “We want the private developer to show good faith in acquiring land,” Ray Bragg, Fontana ‘s redevelopment and special-projects director, told me. “And if you run up against a stumbling block, if you find a landowner unwilling to sell, come to us and then we’ll talk about eminent domain.”

In his majority opinion, Justice Stevens wrote, The City [of New London] has carefully formulated an economic-development plan that it believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community, including–but by no means limited to–new jobs and increased tax revenue.” It was the development plan, and its promise that the seizure of homes would result in positive change–in progress–that clinched the decision for the five consenting judges. Yet these plans, according to the Court’s ruling, need not provide “reasonable certainty” that the “expected public benefits will actually accrue.” Indeed, evidence suggests that cities’ efforts at redevelopment rarely bear fruit. A comprehensive study conducted in California in 1998 shows that cities spend roughly two dollars–on condemnations, the luring of companies, and other aspects of redevelopment–for every dollar gained in growth. In three out of every four of the areas it examined, the study found that redevelopment projects had brought no net increase in tax revenue.

This study is perhaps less surprising than it seems: in neighborhoods filled with small businesses, a few can close and the area will retain its economic center. But if a municipality condemns land and gives it to a big-box retailer and that chain doesn’t move in, or moves in and closes, a wide swath of land is left vacant. This history of condemnation or potential condemnation, moreover, discourages businesses from improving their stores, or new owners from moving in, since they never know when the city might take their land. In one case in Hampton, Virginia, the city condemned homes to build a project anchored by Kmart; then, in 2002, Kmart declared bankruptcy, itself a victim of even more pervasive big-box competitors. At the time, Kmart’s demise left the Hampton space an unused shell. In another case, in Phoenix , the city condemned a small tobacco shop for new development but ultimately found no takers, leaving the land vacant.

Kelo v. New London does include a proviso that may protect homeowners and small businesses from unproven redevelopment plans, with their alluring promises of greater revenue and profit: it sends the issue back to the states, which have the power to set their own standards on seizures. And eleven states already have put forward legislation that would significantly limit the Supreme Court ruling. Republicans in both the Texas House and Senate have proposed amendments to the state constitution prohibiting almost all instances in which eminent domain can be used for economic development or private gain. Tom McClintock, a conservative senator from California, has introduced a similar bill in his state. “No one should have to worry about losing your home to some politically connected developer,” he recently said. “There are 6,000 public agencies in California that now have the power to seize your home, pay you pennies on the dollar for it, and then give it to somebody else for their own personal gain and profit.” Libertarian groups have even proposed using eminent domain to seize the homes of Justices David Souter and Stephen Breyer, both of whom voted with the majority in the New London case.

Although condemnations fall most heavily on Democrats’ key constituencies–the poor and minorities-Democrats at the federal level have done little to try to ensure that eminent domain is used judiciously and constructively. By lending implicit if not explicit support to a flawed enterprise, Democrats are defending a principle–the government’s right to act on behalf of the greater good of its citizenry–that has been abused into obsolescence. And this support only confirms many voters’ fears (and the Republicans’ incessantly pushed portrayal) of the minority party as haughtily paternalistic, unresponsive to individual rights, uncaring about the needs of the little guy. In a pending Senate bill that would prevent all seizures for economic development, only two of the twenty-five cosponsors were Democrats; this summer, 157 Democrats in the House voted against a successful amendment to a bill that restricts transportation funds from being used for eminent domain takings. House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, one of the country’s most prominent and admittedly liberal Democrats, supported the New London decision, even saying, strangely, that the Court’s ruling was “as if God had spoken.” Apparently, these days, even God shops at Wal-Mart.

© 2005 Harper’s Magazine 

Related feature on corporate exploitation of eminent domain: Wal-Mart, the Abuse of Eminent Domain and Corporate Welfare

 

Filed Under: Corporate Welfare / Corporate Tax Issues, Independent Business, Walmart

Canyon Resources Corporation Seizes the (Ballot) Initiative

November 3, 2004 by staff

In Montana, a Corporation Corrupts the Purest Form of Democracy

By Jeff Milchen
Updated November 3, 2004

Editor’s note: Canyon Resources’ $3 million investment bought a lot of ads, but not enough votes on Election Day as Initiative 147 was defeated by a 58 to 42 percent margin. Congratulations to all who worked to stop this corporate assault.

When Montanans first employed the ballot initiative in 1912, all four measures passed had a common aim: revoking the corrupting political power of mining behemoth Amalgamated Copper. So it’s no small irony that, in 2004, a mining corporation is using the initiative process to try reversing the expressed will of Montana citizens.

Executives at Colorado-based Canyon Resources, Inc. (CRI) dislike Montanans’ 1998 decision to pass Initiative 137 and become the first state to ban the practice of spraying cyanide over ore piles to chemically extract gold and silver. CRI remains eager to build a new cyanide heap mine on the Blackfoot River that I-137 prevented, so the company already has invested $3 million (about 98% of all funds) to qualify and market I-147 — an initiative to reverse the ban. That’s a huge sum in a state where 30 second prime-time TV ads in the state’s largest media market cost just $900.

CRI promises new jobs and tax revenues, while opponents warn that the practice inevitably will poison our water supplies, as happened at the company’s notorious CR Kendall mine near Lewiston.

Arguments on those points will rage in the weeks ahead, but let’s not forget a more fundamental issue: why do we allow the citizens’ initiative – theoretically democracy in its purest form – to be used against us by non-citizens (corporations)?

Of course, one could argue that we’ve tried and failed to stop the practice. In 1996, Montanans passed I-125, banning direct corporate funding of initiatives, only to have it struck down in 1998 by a federal judge, based on the notion that corporations possess free speech rights just like you and me.

But saying, “we tried, and the courts wouldn’t let us,” is akin to blaming the Supreme Court for racism before it abolished segregated schools in 1954. The more difficult truth is we’ve failed to protect our rights to self-governance that many Americans died to establish and defend. Like in 1954, public pressure must compel the courts to change — this time to restore necessary limits to corporate power.

When American colonists declared independence from England in 1776, they also freed themselves from control by English corporations that dominated domestic businesses (thanks to preferential treatment by the king ) and extracted colonial wealth. After fighting a revolution to end this exploitation, our founders retained a healthy fear of corporations’ power and limited them to strictly business activities. For decades, states typically prohibited corporations from spending any money to influence politics or even public opinion.

In the 1800s, corporations gradually dismantled those barriers, and by century’s end, their lawyers had persuaded the U.S. Supreme Court that corporations legally were persons entitled to constitutional rights, thus creating “corporate personhood.” The activist judges were undeterred by the fact that corporations are unmentioned in the U.S. Constitution.

Soon, corporations had perverted the Bill of Rights itself by winning its protections — even before women and minorities had full personhood rights — and used this power to deny political rights to real human beings.

Yet corporations’ did not secure a legal privilege to participate in ballot initiatives until the Supreme Court’s 5-4 decision in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (written by former corporate lawyer Lewis Powell in 1978) toppled one of the last barriers to corporate dominance of government.

Today, corporations face no legal limits to influencing or running ballot initiatives in the 24 states (and many local governments) that permit them. The Bellotti precedent also applies to referenda (used in three states), whereby state legislators may refer an issue to a vote by state citizens.

Montanans are not alone in facing corporate attempts at direct lawmaking. In California, a corporate consortium is advancing Proposition 64 to dramatically weaken the nation’s strongest consumer protection law.

Wal-Mart executives have repeatedly used ballot initiatives to overrule local laws that would prevent enormous new “supercenters.” The company lost a high-profile battle in Inglewood, California last spring by literally trying to exempt itself from all local planning and environmental regulations, but as corporations continue molding our law and culture, what was an outrage one year becomes the law soon after. Often, the threat of a costly initiative battle is sufficient to intimidate a community into bending or breaking its rules.

Citizens still win a few skirmishes (let’s hope keeping cyanide out of our rivers and aquifers will be one), but the larger struggle — to determine whether citizens or corporations will control the future of our communities and country — will depend on changing the rules of engagement.

The judges who overturned previous attempts to get corporations out of the initiative process handed us painful defeats, but take heart — each great human rights advance in American history has had to overcome some lost battles before winning. The struggle by citizens to reclaim our rights and return giant corporations to strictly business activities will be no exception.

Jeff Milchen founded ReclaimDemocracy.org, working to revitalize American democracy and restore citizen authority over corporations.

* Every one of 22 donors to the I-147 campaign as of 10/18/04 was a corporation.

Related Resources

Montana’s initiative history is based on research by David Schmidt in “Citizen Lawmakers: The Ballot Initiative Revolution.”

Roots of Rebellion: Why Montana is the Only State to Reject Citizens United

Filed Under: Corporate Welfare / Corporate Tax Issues

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