Case Summary:
Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley
Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley 454 U.S. 290 (1981) was decided December 14, 1981
BURGER, delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, joined. REHNQUIST filed a concurring opinion explaining how this decision was compatible with his dissent in Bellotti . MARSHALL , filed an opinion concurring. BLACKMUN and O'CONNOR, filed an opinion concurring.
WHITE, filed a dissenting opinion.
The Court reversed a California Supreme Court decision that upheld an ordinance in Berkeley, California. The ordinance limited individual contributions to organizations attempting to influence the outcome of a local ballot initiative campaign (proposed instituting rent control) to $250 per person. The ordinance did not attempt to limit the amount an individual could spend personally to influence the initiative.
The California Supreme Court had concluded that the law furthered compelling governmental interests because it ensured that special interest groups could not "corrupt" the initiative process by spending large amounts to support or oppose a ballot measure. Such corruption, the court found, could produce apathetic voters; these governmental interests were held to outweigh the First Amendment interests infringed upon. Finally, it concluded that the law accomplished its goal [454 U.S. 290, 294] by the least restrictive means available. The California Court did not consider the disclosure requirements of the ordinance a sufficient prophylaxis to dispel perceptions of corruption.
Summary of the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning in overturning the law :
* To place a limit on individuals wishing to band together to advance their views on a ballot measure, while placing no limit on individuals acting alone, is clearly a restraint on the right of association. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 , held that contributions to candidates or their committees could be restricted in order to prevent corruption or its appearance. Here, there is no risk of corruption because this case relates to contributions to committees favoring or opposing ballot measures. Also, there is no risk that the voters will be in doubts as to the identity of those whose money supports or opposes a given ballot measure, since the contributors must make their identities known under the disclosure provisions of the ordinance.
* The contribution limit automatically affects expenditures, and limits on expenditures operate as a direct restraint on freedom of expression of groups and individuals wishing to express themselves through groups. There is no significant state or public interest in curtailing debate and discussion of a ballot measure, and the integrity of the political system will be adequately protected if contributors are identified in a public filing revealing the amounts contributed. Pp. 299-300.
* To place a Spartan limit - or indeed any limit - on individuals wishing to band together to advance their views on a ballot measure, while placing none on individuals acting alone, is clearly a restraint on the right of association.
Justice White submitted a passionate dissent on this ruling. You can read this and the full decision at: http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=454&invol=290
Related cases:
* Montana Chamber of Commerce, et. al. v. Algenbright, (2000).
* First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978)
*Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990)
*McConnell v. FEC , FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (1986),
Other Resources:
The
Initiative & Referendum
Institute
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