Conflicts of Interest Rampant Among TV Military Analysts

Media outlets must develop their own, independent, military analysts, ones not beholden to the military-industrial complex, ones whose very sense of self is not defined, nourished, and sustained by the U.S. military.

In separate exposés in The New York Times (April 20 and November 30), David Barstow showed how major media outlets came to rely on retired generals like Barry McCaffrey for analysis. Predictably, many of these men (they were all men) continued as paid advisors to defense contractors even as they appeared on TV. They also often accepted favors from the Pentagon, to include special, often classified, briefings; overseas junkets; and, most valuable of all, access to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

But such influence-peddling and collusion are hardly surprising. Relying on high-ranking, retired military officers to serve as frank and disinterested critics is a bit like inviting Paul von Hindenburg, ex-Field Marshal of the German Army, to testify in 1919 on why his army lost World War I. You'll get some interesting testimony -- just don't expect it to be critical or for that matter even true.

So why did the networks hire so many retired colonels and generals? Perhaps they followed a rationale analogous to that used in hiring retired professional athletes to cover sports -- to provide hard-earned, technical commentary, leavened with occasional anecdotes.

But in the "forever war" in which we became engaged, these retired military officers soon provided not just the color commentary but the play-by-play. And network anchors, lacking first-hand military experience, were reduced to bobble-heads, nodding in respectful agreement.

But war is not a sport. Nor should we cover it as such. We need tough-minded military analysts, not "Team America" boosters and Pentagon spin-meisters.

Why Relying on Senior Military Officers Is Wrongheaded

Our media's concept of relying on retired senior colonels and generals for frank and unbiased analysis was deeply flawed from the beginning. Let's consider five facets to the problem:

• Despite their civilian coat-and-tie camouflage, these officers are not ex-generals and ex-colonels: they are retired generals and colonels. They still carry their rank; they still wear the uniform at military functions; they're still deferentially called "sir" by the rank-and-file. They enjoy constant reminders of their privileged military status. It's not that these men over-identify with the U.S. military -- they are the military.

• The senior colonels and generals I've known despise Monday-morning quarterbacks. Loath to criticize commanders in the field, they tend to defer to the commander-in-chief. Putting on mufti doesn't change this mindset. Rather than airing their most critical thoughts, they tend to keep them private, especially in cases where service loyalty is perceived to be involved.

• Military officers are especially averse to airing criticism if they perceive it might undermine troop morale in the field. Related to this is the belief that "negative" media criticism led to America's defeat in Vietnam, the hoary but nevertheless powerful "stab-in-the-back" myth. Thus, these men see Pentagon boosterism as a service to the nation -- one that they believe is desperately needed to redress the balance of negatively-charged, "liberal," anti-war coverage.

• Paradoxically, that the "War on Terror" has gone badly is a reason why some retired military officers believe we can't afford serious criticism. If you believe the war can and must be won, as most of them do, you may suppress your own doubts, fearing that, if you air them, you'll be responsible for tipping the balance in favor of the enemy.

• The fifth, perhaps most telling, reason why networks should not rely on retired colonels and generals is that it's extremely difficult for anyone , let alone a die-hard military man, to criticize our military because such criticism is taken so personally by so many Americans. When you criticize the military, even abstractly, people hear you attacking Johnny or Suzy -- their son or daughter, or the boy or girl next door, who selflessly enlisted to defend America. Who wants to hear that Johnny or Suzy may possibly be fighting (even dying) for a mistake? And, assuming he believed it, what senior military man wants to appear on TV to pass along that message to America's mothers and fathers?

The Next Step

It's not that retired colonels and generals lack integrity, but they are often deeply conflicted and lacking in self-awareness. And you certainly can't profess to be an objective media analyst while representing contractors vying for funding from the Pentagon.  

So what should the media do? Since it will take time for networks to develop their own corps of independent military analysts, they should consider hiring junior officers and NCOs, with recent combat experience, who have left the military after a few years of honorable service. Civilian military historians could also provide critical commentary. Even foreign military officers might be queried; at least they need not worry about their patriotism being impugned each time they hazard a criticism of the Pentagon.

French premier Georges Clemenceau famously noted that "War is too important to be left to generals." So too is the TV and cable networks' analysis of our wars.

William J. Astore is a retired lieutenant colonel (USAF). He taught at the Air Force Academy and the Naval Postgraduate School and currently teaches at the Pennsylvania College of Technology. This article also appeared in Nieman Watchdog. E-mail:  wastore *at* pct.edu